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J. RODNEY JOHNSON 
A Fiduciary's Investment Duty-The Peril 
of The "Prudent Man Rule" 
THE purpose of this article is ( 1) to report on the 
recent decision in Hoffman v. First Virginia Bank, 1 (2) 
to identify the several problems this decision has 
created for the public and for the bar, (3) to propose a 
statutory solution to these problems, and (4) to suggest 
an interim approach to these problems that draftsmen 
of wills and trusts might take while awaiting the pas-
sage of an appropriate statute. 
The Facts 
Complainants alleged that, pursuant to decedent's 
will, a marital trust was established on August 15, 1972, 
with assets valued at approximately $104,000; that 
between December 7, 1972 and January 4, 1973, approx-
imately $40,000 of these assets (38'fo of the trust's corpus) 
were sold and the proceeds were invested in securities of 
three REITs (real estate investment trusts); that the 
securities of all REITs declined in value during the next 
seven months, until September, 1973, at which time 
they "plummeted"; and that the market for such securi-
ties had "substantially collapsed" by the end of 1973, in 
consequence of which the trust's REIT securities be-
came "substantially worthless." Complainants further 
alleged that the trustee committed various acts of negli-
gence in making and maintaining these investments. 
The trustee demurred, contending that the acts com-
plained of were authorized by the language of dece-
dent's will. 
The Issue 
"In this appeal, the principal question is whether a 
testator, in providing for a testamentary marital trust, 
waived the 'prudent man rule' otherwise applicable in 
the investment of trust assets." 2 
The Holding 
The Court recognizes that a Virginia fiduciary, in the 
performance of its investment duties, may rely upon the 
legal list contained in Code Sections 26-40 and 26-40.1, 
which expressly state that certain enumerated securities 
are "legal investments"; or the fiduciary may elect to 
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invest pursuant to the much broader "prudent man 
rule" which, as codified in Section 26-45.1, reads in part 
as follows: 
... in acquiring, investing, reinvesting, ex-
changing, retaining, selling and managing 
property for the benefit of another, an execu-
tor, administrator, trustee or other fiduciary, 
both individual and corporate, shall exercise 
the judgment of care under the circumstances 
then prevailing, which men of prudence, dis-
cretion and intelligence exercise in the man-
agement of their own affairs, not in regard to 
speculation but in regard to the permanent 
disposition of their funds, considering the 
probable income as well as the probable safety 
of their capital. Within the limitations of the 
foregoing standard, an executor, adminstra-
tor, trustee or other fiduciary, both individual 
and corporate, is authorized to acquire and 
retain every kind of property, real, personal or 
mixed, and every kind of investment, specifi-
cally including but not by way of limitation, 
debentures and other corporate obligations 
and stocks, preferred or common, and securi-
ties of any open-end or closed-end manage-
ment type investment company or investment 
trust registered under the Federal Investment 
Company Act of 1940, as from time to time 
amended, which men of prudence, discretion 
and intelligence acquire or retain for their 
own account ... 
The Court also notes the complainant's concess10n 
that the "prudent man rule" may be waived by a testa-
tor, adds, that "[a]lthough there was no express waiver 
(in this will), a waiver may arise by necessary implica-
tion from the language used in the will," and then the 
Court proceeds to its conclusion on this point in the 
following language: 
In Article V, the testator gave his executor 
and trustee "full discretionary powers of man-
agement ... without being restricted to those 
investments authorized by statute in Virginia 
for the investment of trust funds .... " This 
provision authorized the fiduciary to invest in 
assets other than those specifically listed in 
Code §§ 26-40 and 26-40.1. 
The testator was especially interested in giv-
ing his executor and trustee power to retain 
any or all of his investments, and he exoner-
ated the fiduciary, acting in either capacity, 
from liability for depreciation in the value of 
securities so retained. This provision was 
important to afford flexibility in protecting 
the testator's interests in the closely-held, fam-
ily corporations listed in the inventory of his 
estate. 
The powers of the trustee alone were then 
stated. The will authorized investment "in 
any type of real or personal property ... 
regardless of diversification or State laws, and 
... in common stock, unimproved real estate, 
non-productive items, common trust funds, 
investment company shares .... " This lan-
guage, the Trustee maintains, gave it the 
broadest possible investment authority and 
waived the application of the "prudent man 
rule." We agree. 
Having already provided that the executor 
and trustee could invest without being re-
stricted to the list of legal investments under 
Code§§ 26-40 and 26-40.1, (emphasis added) 
the testator clearly intended to grant more 
comprehensive powers to the trustee alone. 
Accordingly, he specifically waived any re-
quirement of diversification of investments, 
and then removed any further restrictions 
upon the trustee's investment powers by elim-
inating the constraints of laws otherwise 
applicable. We cannot agree with the conten-
tion of the beneficiaries that the testator 
intended by these provisions only to reaffirm 
his waiver of the "legal list" of investments set 
forth in Code§§ 26-40 and 26-40.1. The termi-
nology is too broad to be construed as apply-
ing to a single investment law, embraced 
within the two statutes, that h.ad already been 
eliminated. The language is clear and un-
ambiguous, so that no extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to explain its meaning. We con-
clude that the testator's language must be 
construed as a waiver of the "prudent man 
rule" that had been incorporated into the stat-
ute law of the Commonwealth. 3 
Comment on the Decision 
There are two separate and distinct investment ques-
tions regularly encountered in fiduciary administra-
tion. One question is posed at a very early stage as the 
fiduciary asks "Which of the investments that the dece-
dent made during his lifetime, and which were passed 
to me by reason of his death, may I properly retain?" 4 In 
addition to this question, the fiduciary must ask itself 
throughout the term of its administration "What 
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investments are proper for me to make as an original 
matter?" 5 As the fiduciary is faced with these two sepa-
rate investment questions it is customary to also deal 
separately with the fiduciary's powers concerning these 
questions. An examination of the form-books fur-
nished to the bar by five Richmond banks discloses that 
all of them deal separately with the power to retain and 
the power to invest. Indeed, the statutory "boiler-plate" 
furnished to the entire State bar by the General Assem-
bly in Code 64.1-57 6 provides separately for these sepa-
rate aspects of the overall investment responsibility of a 
fiduciary. 
The major premise in the foregoing decision (see the 
italicized language) is that because the testator, by his 
prior language, had already eliminated the legal list as a 
restriction upon the trustee's power to invest, the neces-
sary result of the testator's latter language was to waive 
the "prudent man rule" as a restriction upon the trus-
tee's power to invest. It is respectfully submitted that the 
decision is incorrect at this point. Instead, it is believed 
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that the prior language (which is found in context at 
220 Va. 837, in paragraph 3; and at 263 S.E. 2d 405, in 
paragraph I) merely states the fiduciaries' powers to 
retain investments made by the decedent during his 
lifetime, and leaves the matter of the trustee's own orig-
inal investments to be dealt with by the latter language. 7 
If this writer's conclusion concerning the prior lan-
guage is correct then, of course, the Court's basis for its 
conclusion that the latter language necessarily waived 
the "prudent man rule" is incorrect and so also is the 
holding of the case. In all fairness to the Court, how-
ever, it must be noted that the distinction between "re-
tention" and "investment" powers was not presented to 
the Court by complaints. 
The Problems Created 
Whether the foregoing analysis is correct or not, it is 
submitted that the Hoffman decision has definitely 
generated great confusion concerning the present ap-
plicability of the "prudent man rule" to Virginia trusts 
that contain standard "boiler-plate" investment provi-
sions. The form-books referred to earlier in this article 
all contain provisions granting additional discretion-
ary investment powers upon the trustee. To what 
extent, if any, do these provisions result in an implied 
waiver of the "prudent man rule"? The Hoffman opin-
ion also states that 
... the express authorization to invest in 
nonproductive items and unimproved real 
estate shows an intent to permit the fiduciary 
in its discretion to invest in speculations. 8 
It is submitted that this is not necessarily true, as a 
matter of law, and it is typically wrong as a matter of 
fact. From a legal standpoint the rule is that "[t]he 
provisions of the trust instrument are ordinarily strictly 
construed against an enlargement of the scope of per-
missible investments beyond those allowed under the 
('prudent man rule')," 9 and the language in question is 
dearly capable of a construction other than an intent to 
permit speculations. From a factual standpoint, it 
borders on the incredible to believe that the typical 
testator actually intends to enable his trustee to specu-
late, i.e. to gamble with the trust fund at the bene-
ficiary's expense, absent specific language to that end. 
Indeed, the primary purpose of most persons in creat-
ing trust funds for the benefit of another is to insure 
that the beneficiary will receive either a certain income 
or else will receive whatever amount may be necessary 
to insure the beneficiary's support. This intent is 
totally inconsistent with an intent to allow the trustee 
to gamble with the corpus that the beneficiary's income 
14 
or support is dependent upon. Yet, in the light of 
Hoffman, standard "boiler-plate" administrative pro-
visions are capable of being construed as impliedly 
waiving the "prudent man rule." 
Moreover it is believed that if a testator, after reading 
through all of the "boiler-plate" contained in his trust 
(a dubious assumption, perhaps, considering the tech-
nical nature of the language regularly used therein and 
the length that runs to 214 lines in the statutory ver-
sion) should ask the drafting attorney what it all 
means, he probably would not receive a detailed expla-
nation but instead would receive a short, tranquillizing 
statement to the effect that "It is just standard, form 
language that the bank likes to have to enable it to do its 
job more efficiently, certainly nothing to be concerned 
about, merely provisions that provide for flexibility in 
administration in the future as times and circum-
stances change in order to enable the trustee to better 
carry out your wishes, etc." 
In addition to not conforming to the desires and 
expectations of the consumer, and the assurances of the 
draftsman, this implied waiver of the "prudent man 
rule" may also create a tax problem for a decedent's 
estate. One of the purposes of the testator in creating a 
"marital" trust in Hoffman presumably was to obtain 
for his estate the benefit of the federal estate tax marital 
deduction. Yet, if the IRS should agree with the Court's 
conclusion concerning the trustee's powers, the testa-
tor's estate would be denied the benefit of this deduc-
tion. The basic rationale of the federal government is 
that the allowance of the marital deduction where a 
spouse is given a life income right and a general power 
of appointment is based on the assumption that there 
will, in fact, be a "right" to income for life. The un-
fettered power of a trustee to eliminate such an income 
through the selection of permissible investments is 
quite inconsistent with the beneficiary having a "right 
to income," and thus the marital deduction is not 
allowable where the trustee has such a power. 10 Of 
course the federal tax audit in the present case was 
concluded long before the present litigation was begun. 
But what about those estates that will pass through 
federal estate tax proceedings in the future? What will 
be the decision concerning the allowability of the fed-
eral estate tax marital deduction if the trust contains 
investment provisions such as the following: 
(c) To invest and reinvest all of the funds of 
the estate as said fiduciary, in his sole discre-
tion, may deem best, including investment in 
stocks, common and preferred, and common 
trust funds, without being restricted to those 
investments expressly approved by statute for 
investment by fiduciaries; and to change in-
vestments from realty to personalty, and vice 
versa. 
(cl) To invest and reinvest all of the funds 
of the estate as said fiduciary, in his sole discre-
tion, may deem best, including investment in 
interests in investment trusts and mutual 
funds, without being restricted to those in-
vestments expressly approved by statute for 
investment by fiduciaries; and to change 
investments from realty to personalty, and 
vice versa. 11 
It was formerly thought that the foregoing language, 
taken from the statutory "boiler-plate," might be 
immune from such an attack, even by a zealous IRS 
agent. In the wake of Hoffman, however, one must 
anticipate the very real possibility of IRS taking the 
position that all such broadly worded investment pow-
ers will result in the implied waiver of the "prudent 
man rule," and thus in the denial of the federal estate 
tax marital deduction. One can almost hear the agent 
saying, "Well, the language in '(c)' authorizes the trus-
tee to depart from the legal list, therefore having already 
eliminated the legal list by the language in paragraph 
(c), the language in (cl) must logically manifest an 
intent to grant more comprehensive powers to the trus-
tee by impliedly waiving the 'prudent man rule'." Of 
course any agent who comes to such an absurd conclu-
sion could be proven wrong by reference to the statutory 
history of these two "boiler-plate" powers. However, 
this ability to prove the agent wrong will be of little 
comfort (i) to those who are unaware of the remedy, (ii) 
to those who will find it less costly to suffer the unwar-
ranted loss of the marital deduction than to litigate in 
order to obtain it, and (iii) to those who must ultimately 
bear the cost of educating the Service concerning this 
aspect of Virginia law. Lastly, even if one is uncon-
cerned about the foregoing statutory "boiler-plate," 
what about the "boiler-plate" contained in the form-
books furnished to the bar by corporate fiduciaries, 
which typically contain broader investment provi-
sions as a part of their "boiler-plate"? 
A Permanent Solution 
A somewhat similar problem, i.e. unintended exten-
sion of an administrative provision, was presented to 
estate planners by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The 
problem then was the possibility that a standard direc-
tion to one's executor to pay all death taxes from the 
residue of one's estate without apportionment might be 
construed as also applying to a "generation skipping 
transfer tax" under IRC § 2601. In order to prevent this 
unintentional, though literal, construction of a rather 
standard administrative provision, the General Assem-
bly enacted the following statute: 
A general direction in a will to pay all taxes 
imposed on account of a testator's death or 
similar language shall not be construed to 
include taxes imposed on a "generation skip-
ping transfer" under § 2601 of the Internal 
Revenue Code or taxes imposed upon the es-
tate of a prior decedent in which the testator 
had no power of appointment or similar 
power of disposition, unless the testator shall 
expressly manifest an intention that such 
taxes be paid out of his estate by reference to§ 
2601 of the Internal Revenue Code or other-
wise.12 
It is believed that a similar statute would be the 
simplest and best solution to the present problem. Such 
a provision, which would logically be added to the end 
of Section 26-45. l, might read as follows: 
( e) A general authorization in a will or trust 
authorizing a fiduciary to invest in such assets 
as the fiduciary, in his sole discretion, may 
deem best, or other language purporting to 
expand the fiduciary's in~estment powers, 
shall not be construed to waive the rule of 
paragraph (a) hereof unless the testator or sett-
lor shall expressly manifest an intention that 
it be waived (i) by reference to the "prudent 
man rule," (ii) by reference to the power of the 
fiduciary to make "speculative" investments, 
or (iii) by other language synonymous with (i) 
or (ii) immediately preceding. 
Not only is it important that the General Assembly 
codify this rule in Virginia, it is also important that the 
General Assembly establish that the "prudent man 
rule" has always been the proper rule of decision in 
Virginia (absent specific language to the contrary), 
notwithstanding the abberational holding in Hoffman. 
Accordingly, in order to establish the foregoing and to 
insure that Hoffman is confined to its unique facts, it is 
further submitted that the bill introducing the above-
suggested statute should also contain a statement that 
"The provisions of this act are declaratory of existing 
law." Such was the course taken by the General Assem-
bly in 1978 when Section 64.l-74(d) was added to the 
Code13 in order to prevent an unintended extension of 
the rule against perpetuities, and it is believed that the 
clarification is equally if not more important in the 
instant case. 14 
An Interim Solution 
Earlier in this article it was suggested that the typical 
draftsman might give a tranquillizing response if que-
ried concerning the "boiler-plate" administrative pro-
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visions in a will or trust. It is also believed that quite 
often the client doesn't even bother to ask about the 
effect of such language because it is recognized that this 
is the lawyer's part of the document (as opposed to the 
dispositive portion of the document) and the client 
alternatively doesn't know to ask, is for some reason 
reticent, or simply trusts the lawyer to do what is in the 
client's best interest. What attorney hasn't, on numer-
ous occasions, heard "Well, I don't know what all that 
legal mumbo-jumbo means, but if you say its what I 
want I'll sign it." And, of course, when the draftsman 
incorporates the statutory "boiler-plate" by reference, 
the client typically doesn't even see the language in 
question. In the aftermath of Hoffman, is there an 
added responsibility of an estate planner to his client 
viv-a-vis administrative provisions? It is submitted that 
if an attorney prepares a will or trust containing 
"boiler-plate" that might be construed to impliedly 
waive the "prudent man rule," and thereby enable a 
trustee to speculate at the beneficiary's expense, as well 
as to endanger the allowance of the marital deduction 
without advising the client of these consequences, he is 
failing to carry out his own fiduciary duty to that client. 
Therefore it is suggested that, until this matter is 
resolved by an appropriate statute, the prudent attorney 
may wish to (1) have a letter in the files of all future 
clients stating that they understand these risks and wish 
to take them, or else (2) add appropriate limiting lan-
guage to the administrative powers, such as, for 
example: 
Nothing contained herein shall be con-
strued as a waiver of the "prudent man rule" 
contained in Section 26-45. l(a) of the Code of 
Virginia as it is written on the date of this will. 
Conclusion 
Regardless of the correctness of the decision in Hoff-
man, the present uncertainty concerning the applica-
bility of the "prudent man rule" in Virginia when the 
governing document contains "boiler-plate" invest-
16 
ment powers is intolerable. It is imperative that the 
General Assembly end this uncertainty with an appro-
priate statute. Pending the passage of such a statute, the 
prudent draftsman may well wish to consider including 
appropriate limiting language in his wills and trusts. 
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